Syracuse University

SURFACE
Economics - Faculty Scholarship

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs

10-7-2004

Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor: Idiosyncratic and
Successful, but Hardly Mysterious
Jerry Kalarickal
Syracuse University and the World Bank

Robert M. Buckley
World Bank

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Kalarickal, Jerry and Buckley, Robert M., "Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor: Idiosyncratic and
Successful, but Hardly Mysterious" (2004). Economics - Faculty Scholarship. 128.
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn/128

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor:
Idiosyncratic and Successful, but Hardly
Mysterious
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World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3427, October 2004
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly,
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors,
or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at
http://econ.worldbank.org.
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Abstract:
In 1986, the World Bank prepared a strategy for low-income housing in developing
countries. This work grew out of the Bank’s efforts to support the urban poor through an
extensive housing assistance program that was launched by Bank President McNamara’s
speech on urban poverty. By that time, the Bank had provided more than $4 billion of such
assistance, and had undertaken an extensive research effort to design support for that lending.
Much has changed since that time, not only in the way the Bank provides shelter assistance,
more than doubling its support since that review, but also in the changing consensus as to
what shelter strategy should be. This paper reviews the emerging consensus. It examines
three new research areas: the empirical analysis of the effects policy has on housing supply;
the richer understanding of the effects that land market regulations have on specific projects
and on the functioning of urban areas; and the alleged mysterious effects that de Soto, for
example, claims that effective property rights have not only for shelter policy but for
development more generally. It also examines the emergence of both a new financial
innovation – micro-enterprise finance – and the increased emphasis given to project design
based on community participation, showing how these approaches more fully reconcile the
incentives faced by beneficiaries and donors. In sum, the paper argues that the evolving
consensus on shelter strategy is not nearly as mysterious as some would claim. Housing
markets in most developing countries remain highly idiosyncratic and constrained.
Nevertheless, the evolving consensus on shelter strategy appears to recognize these
idiosyncrasies and policy constraints as evidenced by the strong and improving performance
of the Bank’s shelter lending.

I.

Background and Introduction

In 1986 a World Bank study distilled the implications of a multi-year research effort
to draw together a strategy for low-income housing in developing countries. This work grew
out of the Bank’s efforts over the previous 14 years to develop ways to support the urban
poor through an extensive housing assistance program, an effort that was formally launched
by Bank President McNamara’s Nairobi speech on urban poverty (McNamara, 1975). As the
study documents, the Bank had provided more than $4 billion to support housing assistance
targeted for the poor, and had undertaken an extensive research effort to help structure that
lending.1 The study, by Mayo, Malpezi and Gross (1986), summarizes the research that went
into developing this program, as well as the lessons learned from the Bank’s shelter projects.
This article reviews subsequent research and the changing consensus on shelter policy since
that study.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the nature
of the World Bank’s shelter projects and the evolution of the strategy over the last 30 years.
The third section reviews the implications of more recent research and the changes in the
world economy for shelter strategy. A final section concludes.

II.

The Changed Policy Environment

Much has changed in the last 18 years; perhaps most important is the change in
public governance. There are now twice as many democratic governments and they are
overwhelmingly much more decentralized. These governments also operate in a more open
and stable, if sometimes volatile world economy.2 Secondly, with the fall of the Soviet
1

The research effort also resulted in a large number of publications, documented in the Handbook of Urban and
Regional Economics (Malpezzi 1999), and which includes work by Malpezzi and Mayo (1987 a and b). This
work in turn, followed and complimented work undertaken by a group of urban economists brought to the Bank
to help analyze and shape this new policy initiative. See bibliography for working papers.
2
Freedom House measures indicate that 46 percent of the countries were ‘not free’ in 1973. This figure falls to
25 percent in 2002. At thee other end of the spectrum, only 29 percent were classified as being ‘free’ in 1973
whereas by 2003, 46 percent were considered free. Between 1986 and 2002 the number of democracies in the
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Union in 1989 and the adoption of market-oriented economic policy in China and India
during the 1990s, the central planning approach to policy has largely been discarded. Almost
all countries now rely on a public policy approach that augments and compliments market
processes rather than substitutes for them. For Bank-supported shelter projects, these
changes mean that the projects are no longer implemented by project specific Implementation
Units which substituted for non-existent local governments, and which often paid little
attention to resource costs. It also means that arguments about the comparative advantages of
the public and private sectors are considerably less likely to cloud the discussion. Finally,
most of the Bank’s borrowers now have more sophisticated and diversified economies and
financial systems. For instance, many developing countries now have access to market rate
housing finance to assist them. This was not the case in 1986.3
On the other hand, by no means have all of the changes been benevolent. There have
been financial crises that led to capital flight and massive simultaneous mortgage defaults, as
in Mexico where in 1995 most of the mortgage loans made under a Bank loan were forgiven.
Indeed, in some cases, over-heated real estate markets seem to have precipitated the crises.4
Moreover, urbanization is no longer thought of only as an engine of growth that occurs as
societies grow and specialize. Instead, as argued by Fay and Opal (2000), in many Sub-

world doubled to just over 120. Finally, the World Development Report (World Bank 1999) reports that 95
percent of democracies had initiated some for of decentralization process by the year 2000. As for
macrostability, 23 countries had inflation rates over 30 percent in 1985 or 1986 as compared to 14 countries in
1999 or 2000, and the median inflation rate fell from 7 percent to 3 Percent.
3
In 1973 the per capita incomes in India and Senegal, two of the first shelter projects, was $218 and $623 in
1995 dollars. In contrast, in the last year the Bank supported projects in Mexico and Latvia with per capita
incomes more than seven times that level. Similarly, in terms of financial development, in 1973, half of the
Bank’s borrowers had financial systems smaller than the Bank’s credit union. In 2001, this share had fallen to
less than one-third.
4
See Quigley (2001) on the role the property market played in the Asian financial crisis.
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Saharan African countries urbanization without growth characterized the 1990s, creating a
new type of housing demand in a much more urbanized if poorer world.5
For shelter policy in developing countries, perhaps the most notable change in recent
years is with respect to the spatial dimension of poverty. This pattern had changed in rather
fundamental ways. Though the majority of the world’s poor continue to live in rural areas,
poverty is rapidly becoming an urban phenomenon. Today, unlike the situation in 1985, in
many of the Bank’s biggest borrowers – e.g. Russia, Brazil, Mexico - most of the poor
already reside in urban areas. Moreover, while in India most poverty remains in the
countryside, in most of its larger states the poverty rate in urban areas is for the first time
higher than it is in rural areas.6 By some estimates, over 50 percent of the world’s poor will
be living in urban areas by 2035, see Ravallion (2002).
In such an environment, it is not surprising that urban slums are not being absorbed
into formal urban economies. Surveys in Brazil and India, for example, indicate that in many
places slum dwellers are no longer participants in a temporary demographic transition
process as was earlier thought to be the case. It is now recognized that many slum dwellers
are not new immigrants who recently arrived from rural areas in search of better livelihoods.
Today, many of the 100,000 pavement dwellers in Mumbai, for instance, are secondgeneration residents, see SPARC (2002), as is the case in Rio’s Favelas, see Perlman (1976
and 2002).

5

There is some debate about the finding that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced rapid urbanization
without accompanying economic growth. Since there have been few censuses available for recent years,
the data used in many such studies have relied on projections of urban population growth from the 70s and
80s. By some accounts, these figures might exaggerate the urbanization rates in some sub-Saharan African
countries. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Satterthwaite (2003). Nevertheless, even
with this qualification, it is clear that in many large African countries, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya to mention
a few, urbanization accompanied impoverishment.
6

In 11 states which include Haryana, Kerala, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, the
poverty rates in urban areas were larger than rural areas (see 10th Five Year Plan (2003).
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Finally, two changes in the approach to development assistance have taken place
which also have implications for shelter strategy: first, greater accountability for aid has been
embodied in a series of quantitative development goals – the Millennium Development Goals
-- which includes a target of improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers over the next
25 years; and second, the structure of official development assistance (ODA) has changed in
both composition and level.7 In the more globalized world economy, ODA now accounts for
a smaller share of international credit flows, and within that lower overall level of assistance,
support for infrastructure investments has declined sharply.8 Therefore, while Bank shelter
assistance has not followed the overall trends in ODA or in infrastructure lending, having
almost doubled since the last review, it has done so against a background of lower overall
development assistance, as well as an assistance that is more quantitatively targeted on
directly assisting the poor.
In sum, since the last review much has indeed changed. This assistance is now
provided in a very different world environment and uses a variety of new instruments.9 In
addition, a considerable amount of additional research has been undertaken. A more robust
understanding of how housing and land markets in both developed and developing countries
work has emerged. As argued by Renaud (1999), there is now an active body of research on
real estate economics in general and for developing countries in particular. This is a very
different situation than existed 18 years ago. It is against this evolving background that we

7

The eight MDG goals are: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education,
promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global
partnership for development. The commitment to significantly improve the lives of 100 million slum
dwellers is listed under the commitment to ensure environmental sustainability. For more information on
MDGs, see http://www.developmentgoals.org/ For a review of progress on the International Development
Goals see www.paris21.org/betterworld.
8
The last decade saw a twenty-five percent decline in Infrastructure lending by the World Bank.
9
See http://www.worldbank.org/urban/housing/ for a quantitative inventory and summary statistics for the
Bank’s shelter lending since 1972
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review how this new environment and evolving policy perspective affects the strategies to
improve the conditions of the millions who live in substandard housing throughout the world.

The Evolution of Bank Shelter Assistance
The Bank’s earliest shelter projects were usually designed to help develop sites and
services in low-income countries. Most of the initial projects were in capital cities and attempted
to show that basic housing services, e.g. shelter, water and sanitation, could be provided at much
lower cost than the housing then being provided by the public sector. The objective, in many
ways, was to show that in rapidly urbanizing, and particularly low-income countries, very basic
shelter designs that were affordable could be provided on a larger scale. While this may now
seem to be a relatively straightforward notion, at that time there was considerable resistance this
idea. Most developing country public housing agencies produced expensive and heavily
subsidized housing that could only meet the needs of a fraction of the demand.10 These projects
also provided an alternative to demolishing squatter settlements as was done in many developing
countries.

The overarching idea of the assistance was to suggest that rather than attempting to
replace the informal sector, or see this sector as a “problem”, public assistance could be used
so that the strengths of this sector could be built upon. As argued by Turner (Turner and
Fichter, 1971), providing just basic services and shelter allowed poor families to expand their
units over time as their savings and resources permitted. It also allowed them to use their
own labor to maintain and increase their wealth.
Over time, the types and locations of World Bank shelter assistance changed. The
first change came in the early 1970s with a shift to upgrading of existing slums rather than
just the development of new sites. The Bank's first policy paper in this area, Housing (World

10

“As recently as 1975 there were few countries willing to contemplate the types of projects that the Bank
was sponsoring. Now [i.e. in 1980] the Bank has helped finance more than thirty-two projects in twenty-six
countries and has projects in preparation in 11 additional countries.” (Churchill and Lycette 1980, p. 16)
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Bank 1975) recommended this change. The second change was to move from projects
focused on one city to national programs, as occurred in the Tanzania project in 1978. This
nation-wide orientation became a common feature of subsequent sites and service projects.
A few years later in 1981, the Bank made its first completely non-shelter urban loan to Côte
d’Ivoire. This project was to begin a totally separate branch of Bank support that included
issues such as municipal finance, urban management and inter-governmental relations. In
retrospect, it is somewhat surprising that it was a full decade after Bank Urban lending began
that an urban loan without a shelter component was finally made. This non-shelter related
share of urban lending has grown rapidly and now comprises 55 percent of total urban
lending.
In 1980 a third type of shelter project, one that over time would become increasingly
important, was developed. We refer to this type of project as a policy-based loan, one that
views the project as a way of embodying accompanying policy changes in a specific
investment.11 An example of such lending is the Mexican project of 1992 which focused on
reforming local housing market regulations to make the housing being financed more
affordable.
The Bank began a fourth type of shelter project in 1982 in Zimbabwe when a project
was designed which gave central emphasis to the method of financing the investments. The
project was financed through privately owned building societies that carefully monitored loan
recovery. Housing finance projects were to become a significant portion of Bank shelter
assistance in the 1980s and have now become an active line of IFC business. Finally, in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, following earthquakes in Mexico and Iran, shelter assistance for
countries hit by disasters became more than just an occasional project.
11

See the Housing and Land Thematic Group website: http://wwwint.worldbank.org/jsp/sectors_view.jsp?tab=2&gwitem=474019 for a definition of policy-based lending as well
as details on all projects data reported here.
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To summarize the Bank’s shelter lending, by 1986 over two-thirds of the 97 Bank
shelter projects and almost 50 percent of all urban projects were for either sites and service
projects or slum upgrading. A few years before that review, two new types of loans – for
housing finance and to encourage housing policy change – were introduced. Finally, since
1986 a new instrument for disaster relief was implemented that now accounts for about 15
percent of annual shelter assistance. In total, since 1972, the Bank group has provided over
$13 billion in shelter assistance in 249 loans. These loans have had a remarkable degree of
success, as measured by the Bank’s independent Office of Evaluation, with more than 88
percent of the lending having a satisfactory outcome versus 75 percent for the Bank over the
entire period, and more than 95 percent having a satisfactory outcome in the last decade.12

III.

Research on Housing Markets

The Research for the Last Review: In light of this evolving pattern of assistance the
question arises as to what role research played in developing this shelter strategy. This
question, in many ways, is what Mayo, Malpezzi and Gross (1986) attempt to answer. In
particular, they emphasize the policy implications of the following aspects of Banksupported research findings.
•

First, the regularity of housing demand across time and space, drawing out the

implications this finding has for both revising project design and building codes;
•

Second, the importance of the provision of property title, with the associated

need to make sure that beneficiaries received formal titles for their properties;
•

Third, the potentially important role of the development of housing finance; and

12

In the same period, overall bank lending had a satisfactory rating of 82 per cent. Among the 15 sectors,
only two sectors had higher satisfactory outcomes while eleven sectors had satisfactory outcomes less than
90 per cent. (Global Information/Communications Technology and Social Development) For more
information on how programs are rated see: http://www.worldbank.org/oed/
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•

Fourth, the effects land market regulations had on the efficacy of specific

projects.
The first research finding – that housing demand across the world was highly regular
– provided some perspective on how the Bank could most effectively structure many of the
components of the housing projects. In retrospect, this finding may now seem almost naïve,
but it is important to remember that it was only 10 years prior to that review that the first
cross-country empirical study of housing investment was undertaken, by Burns and Grebler
(1977). In addition, and more importantly, in the year that study was undertaken public
housing production and ownership was the main vehicle of housing assistance throughout
much of the developing world. For instance, at that time, China, the 15 countries established
since the 1991 dissolution of the former Soviet Union, as well as India, Korea, Mexico,
Argentina, and many African countries all had very active public housing programs.13 Many
of these countries also proscribed or discouraged private production of housing.
The work on housing demand also provided a basis for understanding what kind of
standards and units were affordable to low-income families. It sought to demonstrate how
and why the unaffordable standards pursued in most places left the public sector not only
unable to meet housing demand, but also drove so much housing supply into the informal
sector and illegality. It also showed why it was so important to focus on the details about the
kind of housing units that the poor could afford without the aid of subsidies. That is, the
work emphasized why the units produced could be sustainably financed only if modest
housing standards appropriate to beneficiaries’ lower income levels were used.

13

At about the time of the last review, Tolley in work subsequently published in 1991, demonstrated the
importance of rents based on a cost of capital perspective in China, contributing to China’s initial housing reform
program. Shortly thereafter, in 1992, Renaud wrote “Why the Former Soviet Union Needs Housing Markets.”
(1992)

8

The second research finding stressed the importance of providing security of tenure
and title to those in the informal sector, see Jimenez (1984), Follain and Jimenez (1985) and
Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988), and it often involved the empirical estimation of just
how much value low-income beneficiaries would place on having this title.14 While this
work focused largely on econometric estimation of this valuation, it foreshadowed the
subsequent work of de Soto (1989 and 2000) that started a lively debate on the importance of
property rights in transforming the economic opportunities of the poor.
The central policy implication of this work was how important it is to provide a clear
property title. This was a view that, in many respects, was at odds with what might be
described as both the mainstream property rights literature of economics, such as Demsetz
(1967) and the anthropological research, such as Peattie and Aldrete-Hass (1981). The
former argues that property rights develop when there is sufficient demand for them. Property
rights, according to this formulation, will develop when the benefits of internalizing the
externalities exceed the costs of not doing so. Based on this perspective, the absence of such
rights reflects the absence of demand for such rights and is not a supply constraint. The
latter, anthropological perspective, suggests that the notion of property rights is not a discrete
choice but rather a spectrum of choices depending very much on idiosyncratic circumstances.
The Bank work, in contrast to both of these perspectives, suggested that the lack of
institutional capacity to deal with rapid urbanization had prevented the benefits of title from
being realized. This perceived institutional imperfection played an important role in the
structuring of Bank shelter projects during the early years of assistance.
The concern with housing finance arose because by 1986 it had become increasingly
apparent that it was not just the specific kind of asset being financed that was important, but
14

By no means did the work on the importance of tenure security start in the 1980s. Work by Mangin
(1967), Turner and Fischer (1971) and Turner (1976) among others had emphasized the importance of
secure titles and tenure security in the late sixties and seventies.
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how funds were to be mobilized to support the demand for these assets. In a sense, the shift
recognized that in virtually all developing countries not only were insufficient assets of
affordable dimensions being produced, but so too there was also not a system of finance to
support the funding of these investments.15 Renaud (1984) documented how the interest rates
charged on Bank-supported projects by specialized, usually public lenders were usually
unsustainable and often hindered the entry of private financial institutions. Such a finding
required that emphasis be given to the constraints on the ability of lenders to compete for the
financial resources to on-lend.
In some ways, like the earlier argument about the regularity of housing demand, the
notion that competitive financial systems could generate more resources appears now to be
an almost foregone conclusion. However, it is once again useful to consider just how much
conditions have changed since that time. In the 1980s, as noted in Diamond and Lea (1992),
most European financial systems operated under extensive financial controls – credit
controls, limits on the terms for loans -- and were segmented and subsidized. At the same
time, the US was in the midst of the savings and loan crisis. That is, as recently as 1986 the
financial systems in developed countries were tightly controlled, directed, and not nearly as
liberalized as they are today. Against this backdrop, the Bank’s view that developing
countries should move to rapidly liberalize housing finance systems could in many ways be
said to have been more market-oriented than the systems of market-oriented developed
economies at that time.
Finally, like the concern with finance, the interest in land market regulations arose
with the realization of how important the physical layout of sites and service projects could
be to the success of these projects, see Bertaud, Bertaud and Wright (1988). The work

15

Colombia represents an exception to the lack of housing finance in developing countries at that time. See
Buckley (1996) for a discussion.
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showed that land use regulations, such as rights of way, set backs, and the amount of land
provided for community facilities, could cumulatively increase costs markedly, making
housing affordable only for higher-income groups. Ultimately, this work suggested that
projects that did not consider the broader land policy dimensions could become enclaves that
would not be replicable.
For the Bank, these emerging lessons resulted in a new emphasis on policy and
institutions as fundamental aspects of project support. While these emphases had always
been an important aspect of Bank shelter projects, with the coming of the 1990s this aspect of
support received particular attention in places such as Mexico and Russia, and resulted in the
fourth type of housing assistance mentioned above -- policy-based loans.

Subsequent Research Findings on the Bank’s Strategy. Since the 1986 review, the
findings of earlier research were subjected to additional scrutiny both by further research and
by events.
Evidence on the Effects of Policy on Housing Supply
At the time of the last review, in contrast to the path-breaking work of Reid (1962) on
housing demand, little was known about housing supply. In part to support the Bank’s 1993
Housing Policy Paper: Enabling Markets to Work more empirically based cross-country
evidence on sector performance was accumulated. This data collection effort was initiated
under a World Bank-UN Habitat exercise called The Housing Indicators Program, which
was initiated in 1989. This program addressed the dearth of comparable cross-country (or
city) data on housing and urban development outcomes. In order to fill this gap, data were
collected on basic urban and housing indicators for a sample of 51 cities in both developed
and developing countries. This program provided the first empirical basis to analyze the
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cross-country effects that policies could have on housing market supply conditions, and, like
the earlier work on housing demand, resulted in a variety of published works such as
Hegedus, Mayo and Tosics (1997), Malpezzi and Mayo (1997a), Angel (2000), and Murray
(2001). This effort has now become part of an on-going monitoring program continued by
UN Habitat.
The basic proposition of this work is that the effects of policy on housing supply
matter, and in some cases matter a great deal, see Angel (2000). Policies that restrictively
regulate the housing market and/or the building industry decrease housing supply elasticity.
When supply is inelastic the same increase in demand – driven by, say, rapid urbanization –
results in a much larger increase in price and a much smaller increase in quantity supplied.
These results imply that implicit regulatory taxes that limit supply of housing can more than
offset the direct assistance to the poor, as argued by Das and Lobo (2001) for India.
While the intuition behind the notion of an inelastic supply curve is straightforward,
the empirical support for it was not. That is, it was not until the late 1980s when in a widelycited article, Mankiw and Weil (1989) argued that because of the combination of a low
housing supply elasticity and a housing market that operated with less than perfect foresight
that demographic changes in the US were likely to have extraordinary effects on house
prices. This paper generated a cottage industry concerned with estimation techniques which,
in turn, had the salutary effect of producing sufficient evidence of both supply inelasticity,
and of the degree to which policy contributed to the inelasticity for the US and UK, see
Woodward (1992), Mankiw and Weil (1992), and Green and Hendershott (1996).
For example, Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) examine why the price of housing in some
markets in the US is so expensive relative to its cost of production. They find evidence that
markets with the highest housing prices are areas where the constraining effects of land use

12

regulation are also the highest.16 They also find little evidence that high prices lead to
smaller lot sizes as would be expected if supply were elastic. Finally, they find that measures
of regulation are highly correlated with house prices. In sum, they, like Quigley and Raphael
(2004), conclude that local regulations are largely to blame for the high house prices
observed in many cities in the US. Similarly, in the U.K, a study by Cheshire and Sheppard
(1989) compares house prices in two comparable cities that differ in the relative
restrictiveness of land development regulations. They also find that policies that are more
restrictive lead to higher prices.
For developing countries, similar results on the effect of policy on housing supply
elasticity have also been obtained. Bank work on Malaysia, for example, was generalized by
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997a) in an empirical analysis of the housing supply elasticities in
three countries: Malaysia, Korea and Thailand.17 The evidence supported their hypothesis
that Malaysia and Korea would have unresponsive housing supply due to a more constraining
regulatory framework. Finally, Green, Malpezzi and Vandell (1994) find similar
microeconomic results on the importance of supply constraints for South Korea.18
To sum up, research on the effects of housing policy on the supply of housing in the
past decade has provided empirical support for the view that housing policy reform is
essential to improving housing outcomes for low-income groups. This work suggests that if
development assistance is to provide help to more than the limited number of direct

16

Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) look at two ways of valuing land. First, they use a housing hedonic model to find
out the value consumers put on larger plots. They then compare this price of land with the price of land that is
calculated by subtracting the construction costs from home value (and dividing by the number of acres). In a
competitive market, the two prices of land should be equal. They find that the hedonic price of land is on
average only 10 percent of the value calculated with the second methodology, suggesting that factors other than
production costs drive house prices.
17

For further discussion on the findings from this research see Baken and der Linden (1993), Malpezzi
(1994) and Jones (1996).
18
For more empirical work on the relation between housing prices and regulations, see Fischel (1990),
Malpezzi (1996), Evans (1999), and Malpezzi (1999).
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beneficiaries of assistance programs, more attention must be paid to the often idiosyncratic
and city-specific policies which control the type, location, and standards of housing.
From Supply Conditions to Greater Community Participation. Recent research has
revealed that very often highly variable local supply conditions matter greatly. These
conditions have implications for the structure of the projects themselves. For example, the
implications of the finding of strong regularities with respect to housing demand lead to an
emphasis on affordable design standards, and an understanding of beneficiaries’ likely
willingness to pay. In the early years of Bank lending, little attention was given in this
perspective to involving the beneficiaries in the projects in any way other than as direct
consumers.19 The result was that the Bank’s sites and services, projects, in effect, often
became low-cost public housing programs rather than an exercise that captured the initiative
and imagination of the beneficiaries. In many ways, as shown by Baross (1990) in the early
Bank shelter projects, Turner’s (Turner and Fichter 1972) aspirations for enabling and
empowering the poor to house themselves remained unfulfilled. Bank projects had helped
scale back the costs of the units produced, but the public sector often remained he producer.

In recent years, the nature of the involvement of beneficiaries has changed. The
importance of community involvement and the importance of using social capital to
leverage Bank resources has become a major thrust of Bank policy. Efforts to stimulate
community driven development have grown rapidly as Bank studies, such as Gibbs,
Fumo and Kuby (1999), have shown the strong positive effects community-based
organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can have on Banksupported projects. As a consequence, rather than the engineering, technocratic approach

19

This is not to say that community participation was completely ignored in the early urban projects. Many
projects did indeed have community components to them but these were constrained by absence of
techniques available today as well as highly centralized decision making structures in client countries.
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embodied in early Bank projects, the current approach embodies a much more
community-based perspective, one that focuses on providing local public goods for urban
shelter projects. Under this approach, NGOs and CBOs help address questions about the
provision of shared goods, such as water and sanitation, as well as help with shelter
design and the targeting of assistance to the most needy.20
Land Markets and Urban Spatial Structure
At the time of the last review the over-riding analytical perspective governing urban
and housing economics was based on an abstract model of the urban economy supported by
what Mills and Tan (1980) refer to as “…one of the most pervasive and best documented
trends in the developed world…” – the monocentric city model (developed by Alonso, Muth,
and Mills, see citations). This model predicts a radial city with residences located in rings
around a central business district. The rent and land price gradient (and density) falls with
distance from the central business district. Land use in a monocentric model is determined by a
trade-off between the desire for space and the desire to minimize commuting costs; and housing
supply elasticity, as Muth (1969) inferred, is close to infinitely elastic.

Mohan (1994) shows that this simple if abstract model characterized both developing
and developed country cities over time. His results support the 1951 aphorism of Colin Clark
(1951) that “all cities west of Budapest and east of Los Angeles” i.e. the market-based cities - had the negative density gradients implied by the model. This finding, in turn, implied that

20

In Bank-supported work the success of this approach is perhaps most vividly demonstrated in the slumdweller relocation in Mumbai, financed under the on going Second Mumbai Urban Transport Project.
Under this project the Bank, working with Mumbai NGOs – SPARC and the National Slum Dwellers
Federation – was able to support the relocation of more than 20,000 families who lived in slums along the
railroad tracks into the city. The relocation improved the living situation of the slum dwellers and
simultaneously improved the effectiveness of the city’s transport infrastructure. It would not have been
possible without the active engagement of the community as has been documented by Appadurai (2001)
among others. This sort of project was essentially unthinkable at the time of the last review.
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the ability of policy-makers to affect the structure of cities and the functioning of housing
markets was severely circumscribed.
Not surprisingly, given this presumption, most of the land market concerns of Bank
strategy focused on the microeconomic aspects of land use regulations. Like the focus on the
empirical regularity of housing demand, this perspective led to a neglect of idiosyncratic,
localized conditions. Subsequent world events, however, such as the fall of the Soviet Union
and the end of Apartheid in South Africa permitted cities in the part of the world outside
Clark’s ambit to be subjected to empirical analysis. Based largely on the first set of
comparable data on more than 50 cities - much of which is summarized in Bertaud (2003) -the results provide increasing evidence that urban spatial patterns diverge substantially from
those predicted by the standard urban models.21 Moreover, the divergences are particularly
strong in environments where policy superseded market processes in determining urban land
use.

Figure 1 presents the density gradients for two very different but market-oriented
cities – Paris and Atlanta -- as well as two of the more extreme policy-controlled city
density structures, Johannesburg and Moscow. Cumulatively, these four images provide
both some sense of how much policy can disrupt both the functioning of land markets
and the underlying structure of cities and housing markets, as well as just how
idiosyncratic urban spatial patterns can be across cities.
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The bibliography provides a number of citations to this data. The most comprehensive source is the
website: http://alain-bertaud.com/
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Figure 1: Land Use Gradients for Various Cities

Atlanta – Density Profile

Paris – Density Profile

Moscow – Density Profile

Johannesburg – Density Profile
Source: Bertaud, various studies.

The first two graphs depict Atlanta and Paris, two very different cities, but also two
places characterized by negative gradients over most of their built-up area. The former city is
among the least densely populated cities in the world and its automobile-based spatial
structure has a significantly different structure from Paris, or for that matter most European
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cities. Nevertheless, in both cities the observed patterns generally follow the predictions of
the monocentric city model.
This consistency with the model disappears in the next two graphs: In both Moscow
and Johannesburg the negative gradient disappears. The Moscow graph is from Bertaud and
Renaud (1997), which examines the spatial structure of Moscow after 70 years of non-market
planning. They show that a tightly controlled government investment and rationing system
created rusting factories in prime locations, and high-density residential areas in distant
suburbs. Such a spatial outcome, they argue, reduces economic and social efficiency, and
worsens the city’s environment.
The Russian work was followed by work in South Africa, where the Apartheid
system also had similarly rigorous laws controlling land use, in this case by race. The Group
Areas Act required black workers to live in dormitory towns separated from the white core
cities by buffer zones. This law resulted in extremely long commutes and economic hardship
for black South Africans. Brueckner (1996) models the welfare gains that might result from
the repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1991. He shows that allowing all South Africans the
freedom to locate where they could maximize their utility would increase aggregate welfare.
Thus, like Bertaud and Renaud’s (1997) conclusions about Moscow, he also implies that the
Apartheid policies, apart from being racist, were also highly inefficient.
From the perspective of the effects of land market restrictions, the fundamental points
of the graphs in figure 1 are two: first, land use restrictions can and have imposed heavy costs
on urban dwellers, decreasing both efficiency and equity; and second, these constraints are
undoubtedly highly variable across cities and history. To get a sense of just how variable
such costs might be, it is useful to contrast Bertaud and Brueckner (2004) who examine the
welfare impact of what is known as Floor Area Ratio (FAR) restrictions in the Indian city of
Bangalore with those of Bertaud, Buckley and Owens (2003) who analyze the same sorts of
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restrictions in Mumbai. In both cities, policies that restrict the density of jobs and population
in the city center led to the expansion of the cities – and resulted in longer commute times
and inefficient energy use. In the first case, the authors find that these restrictions imposed
welfare costs between 3 and 6 percent of average household consumption. That is a costly
result, but it is nowhere near as costly as the latter study estimates is the case in Mumbai. In
that severely topographically constrained city, the same methodology suggests that the same
sorts of FAR restrictions impose much higher welfare costs.
The main lesson from this literature is that land market policies go well beyond the
project-specific concerns given such prominence in the Bank’s earlier strategy. These
policies fundamentally affect cities’ ability to provide the agglomeration gains and thereby
serve as growth centers. In so doing these policies constrain opportunities for higher more
equitable growth.

New Form of Market Failure
Perhaps the biggest conceptual challenge faced by the Bank’s low-income housing
strategy in recent years has been the questions posed by the fall of the Soviet Union. The
challenge arose because the nature of the problems is so different. In transition economies,
migrations of the rural poor do not envelop rapidly urbanizing areas. In fact, exactly the
opposite situation has obtained. Lower-income workers were already often in cities, and in
the FSU, often in one-industry cities, where they often experienced some of the worst
recessions recorded (see Buckley and Mini 2001). As a result, low-income workers quickly
became the unemployed poor as the manufacturing base imploded. At the same time, there
was no physical shortage of housing. By international standards as shown by Hegedus, Mayo
and Tosics (1997), the urban population could even be described as over-housed even if
administrative rationing systems caused severe misallocations. These very different housing
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problems led to a broad range of Bank projects and a sharp increase in Bank lending in the
region.22
This work also led to the discovery of one of the first new forms of market failure
observed in the past 50 years. This new market failure is identified by Heller (1998) in an
analysis of the factors that constrained the privatization of real estate in Moscow. He argues
that the way transition governments transferred property rights – by not endowing anyone
with a bundle of rights that represents full ownership – prevented effective resource usage.
In other words, he argues that in Russia the transition produced a contractual situation that in
many ways is the opposite of the traditional “commons problem” in which no one has clear
ownership rights to a shared good. In the Russian case, too many were given some form of
claim on a particular piece of property. Just as too little control leads to over-usage of a
resource in the commons situation, too much control in an anti-commons situation leads to
under-usage and under-maintenance. Heller’s work was subsequently formalized in an
economic model by Buchanan and Yoon (2000 and 2001) and applied to other industries,
such as the pharmaceutical industry by Heller and Eisenberg (1998).23
Certainly if one looks at the continuing problems with the privatization of the
estimated $1 trillion dollars of residential real estate that was undertaken in the transition
countries during the 1990s, World Bank (2001), an anti-commons problem seems to be very
much the problem. In most transition countries, the government privatized individual
apartment units under essentially give away terms, but the fabric of the buildings – the roofs,
elevators and general energy efficiency of the buildings – remain unmanaged. Congested and
ambiguous ownership rights to common property areas constrain the emergence of effective
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See http://www.worldbank.org/urban/housing/
While the formalization of Heller’s work by a Nobel prize winning public choice theoretician and its
application to another industry suggests that his “anti-commons” problem is an interesting one, in many
ways, most of the arguments were raised more than 50 years earlier by von Mises (1949).
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property management throughout the region, and that gives the sense that Heller’s argument
has considerable force. More than a decade after reform began, in only a few countries in
the region, e.g. the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Estonia have effective
ownership structures developed even though in most places the rule of law is now in place.

Is Capitalism So Mysterious?
Hernando de Soto’s most recent book, The Mystery of Capital, makes a widely cited
claim that secure property rights to land is in fact the answer to the mystery of why
capitalism is such a productive economic system in the West. A corollary of this argument is
that the absence of secure tenure explains the failure of capitalism to take off in the
developing world. He makes a compelling case, at least at first reading, that property rights
as embodied in titles are an essential mechanism for converting assets to usable wealth.
Titles, de Soto argues, “capture and organize all the relevant information required to
conceptualize the potential value of an asset and so allows us to control it.”24 He estimates
that if developing countries could provide secure property rights to residential property, they
would be able to effectively “unlock” $9.3 trillion of what he calls “dead capital” blaming the
absence of such well-defined property rights for the failure of capitalism in the developing
world. As noted earlier, his views in this regard echo those of the early Bank research on this
topic and would appear to confirm them.
However, on closer study, the strength of de Soto’s claims seems problematic.
Though there is good reason to agree that improving property rights should be an essential
part of any reform process, a growing body of analysis reviewed by Woodruff (2001) argues
that titling programs should be carried out in conjunction with the changing spectrum of
property rights definitions that characterize tenure in developing countries.
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De Soto (2000). p. 47
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This argument implies that there are not likely to be “quick wins” of the sort
identified by de Soto. Among other practical problems that reduce the seemingly large gains
that could be realized are the following. First, titling is often a costly process. It is not just a
matter of formalizing informal arrangements that already exist. Very often, contradictory
claims of ownership succeed the announcements of titling programs. As Woodruff (2001)
shows, the costs of adjudicating these claims may abrogate the gains from titling. Second, an
apparent paradox accompanies any titling program for informal residents. Much of the land
on which informal houses are built is obtained through illegal squatting on private property
without any compensation paid to existing owners. Therefore, any titling program will have
to consider providing amnesty for those who benefited from invasions. Whether such a
process will result in greater respect for property rights is open to question. Third, as LeeSmith’s (1997) analysis of property contracts in Kenya shows, this contract’s value depends
in large part on other existing and often unwritten contracts such as the degree of access
women are allowed to exercise with respect to property. This broader web of societal
contracts may well reduce the value given to property titles in isolation.
Besides, there is also less value to a title if it cannot offer value as collateral. Such a
result occurs in most of Sub-Saharan Africa – and many other parts of the developing world –
because there is no effective formal financial system that can help realize the value of the
collateral. Moreover, even if a formal financial sector is functioning, very often many of
those who live in informal housing are self-employed or work in the informal sector, with the
result that it is difficult for them to show proof of income – a necessary condition to
obtaining credit from formal financial institutions. The result is that in most of the
developing world the collateral value of property title remains low.
These problems do not mean that housing policy should not include policies that
improve tenure and the legal framework for individual ownership. Rather, it is to say that it
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would be dangerous to promote formal titling programs as the sole solution necessary to
solve the problems of the urban poor as some have suggested. In many cases, formal titles
are unquestionably valuable. Nevertheless, in most developing countries, where the capital
markets are undeveloped and a spectrum of ownership structures exist, titling alone will not
“unlock” capital. While such property rights may often be a necessary condition to develop a
fully functional housing market, they are not a sufficient condition to unlock the trillions that
are now locked up in dead assets. A set of interlocking, complementary reforms are also
necessary. In short, while capitalism may well be mysterious it is so in subtle ways. The
poor are not impoverished because a simple panacea has been ignored or simply
misunderstood.

Housing Finance
The last review placed considerable emphasis on the need to develop a sustainable
supply of finance to fund low-cost housing investments, and there has indeed been an
increasing Bank Group involvement in this area. For example, housing finance has emerged
as an increasingly important vehicle for Bank shelter assistance particularly through the
IFC’s ability to engage the private sector directly. During the 1990s, the IFC undertook more
than 20 projects, usually taking the form of loans, for over $640 million and 14 percent of the
Bank Group’s shelter support during this period.25 In addition, Bank assistance, along with
that of the IFC and USAID, also contributed in important ways to the development of a
market-based housing finance system in India, a country that had previously effectively
proscribed the provision of mortgage credit. As argued by Buckley (1994) improving
housing finance can have any number of beneficial effects on savings behavior, financial
soundness, and housing conditions, but in few instances have Bank projects been able to
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See http://www.worldbank.org/urban/housing/ for more details.
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directly assist the development of such finance for the poor, as was conjectured in the last
review.
However, this result does not mean that housing finance for the poor is not
developing. Rather, it means that the real promise for assisting low-income families with
housing finance is emerging largely outside of the Bank’s operations. It is emerging through
one of the most promising financial innovations of recent years -- the success of microfinance institutions in the developing world. This successful innovation offers the possibility
of finance for the poor and is increasingly being used to support housing upgrading, see
Ferguson and Navarette (2003), and ACCION (2003). This financial innovation offers the
possibility of sustainable, leveraged finance in ways that were not possible even a decade
ago. However, as Buckley and Vogel (1999) show, just as local housing market supply
conditions are highly idiosyncratic, microfinance operations are even more so: so far they
have only been successful when built on locally-developed methods which insure that
repayment incentives are grounded in local mores.

IV.

Conclusion

In a word, perhaps the main argument of the Bank’s Shelter Policy is that it is
distortions of markets, oftentimes well intended, that create the shelter-related problems
faced by low-income families that can most easily be addressed. As a result, the 1986 study
argued that with such a long-lived, spatially specific, socially-freighted good as housing the
public sector would not be a good producer, owner, or financer of housing units. Nor would
it be an effective designer of subdivisions for land development. The 1993 Housing Policy
Paper carried that argument forward in more detail and with considerably more empirical
evidence.
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The research reviewed here indicates that in recent years empirical evidence largely,
but not completely, in support of these views has accumulated. This is not to say that the
shelter problems faced by low-income families in poor countries can be completely addressed
by changes in government housing and land market policies. Rather, it is to emphasize that
many sector-specific policies exacerbate rather than improve the shelter situation of the poor
and that improved policies, by themselves, without additional resources can improve the
situation. Land market regulations matter more than was thought to be the case; secure
formal titles matter less. The earlier literature also gave little emphasis to community
participation in project design but this oversight is being corrected by subsequent literature
and experience. But, besides the findings of subsequent research, there is another altogether
different metric against which the Bank’s strategy can be measured: that is, have practices
recommended by the strategy been adopted by many countries?
According to this standard, the Bank’s strategy appears to have been very robust. For
example, President Gorbachev’s main advisers on transition argued that the FSU’s public
production and ownership of housing caused it to be the least efficient sector in the
economy.26 Similarly, in 2002 the Government of India began an Urban Reform Initiative
Fund to reward states that eliminate real estate market regulatory constraints, such as binding
rent control and urban land market ownership restrictions. This approach is extremely
different from the perspective on the public role in housing policy that has characterized
India’s shelter policies for more than 30 years.
Reforms in developed countries follow a similar pattern. For instance, the emergence
of private housing finance in the 1990s in much of Europe, and even in a number of
developing economies, such as China, India, Malaysia and Mexico, is certainly consistent
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This report prepared by Grigory Yarlinsky and Stanislav Shatalin for Gorbachev as part of the early
efforts to focus on what reforms should be undertaken in the first 500 days.
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with the perspectives underlying the Bank’s strategy. It is now a widely held view that
directed credit systems are considerably less resilient and more prone to shocks. As the
increasing IFC role suggests public sector housing banks are gradually being superceded by
market-oriented private lenders. Finally, the wide-spread adoption of housing vouchers as
the central vehicle to provide housing subsidies across almost all developed economies (see
Boelhouwer (1997)) implies a similarly wide-spread recognition of the superiority of transfer
mechanisms that use market incentives. This is a welcome change to mechanisms that
replaced market incentives, as many public housing programs did even in OECD countries in
the 1980s and early 1990s.

In sum, shelter policy has indeed evolved over recent years. Perhaps the foremost
lesson we have learned is that the maintained hypothesis of the Bank’s shelter policy has
been confirmed – a targeted and limited public role is a sine qua non for a wellfunctioning housing sector. At the same time, there is no mysterious, straightforward
capitalist panacea that can address all of the shelter problems faced by low-income
families in developing countries. Circumstances vary widely and policy must be
designed to exploit local conditions. Just providing titles, for instance, will not magically
transform the housing situation of the poor. We have also achieved a better empirical
understanding of the sometimes profound effects that regulatory policies can have on the
functioning of housing markets, and a much stronger sense of the need to incorporate the
views of the poor in how to effectively address their concerns. Increased community
involvement is not only good social policy, it also improves project performance.27 This
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A recent Bank study “Overview of the World Bank’s Experience in Urban Projects with Community
Participation” found that 31 percent of Urban Projects in the 1991-2001 period has a Community
Participation component compared to 11 percent on the 1981 –1990 period. In the 1991-2001 period,
projects which had a community participation component were found to have a satisfactory outcome rate of
86 percent when compared to all urban projects which had satisfactory outcome rates of 71 percent.
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improved empirical understanding, along with the more widespread commitment to a
reliance on private markets, should enable the Bank’s shelter assistance to continue to
function as one of the most effective of all Bank sectors.
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